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LEIF STENBERG

Ü n a warm evening at the end of April 1995, I found myself in a beautiful house in
the old quarter of Damascus. I was in the home of one of the younger members of
the Naqshbandi order, sitting on the floor of one of the rooms in the house. The light
was dim. Around me sat soıne twenty young men, all of them members of the order.
They were performing a religious ri tual within the mystical tradition of Islam called
mawl!d. They were listening to a recitation, singing in honor of God and were meditating silently. After the ritual, we sat together around a table, discussing the relationship between Christianity and Islam, as well as between the Muslim world and
the so-called West. During the discussion, it turned out that one of the young men
spoke Swedish. He worked as a civil engineer and had studied at Chalmers
Polytechnic in Gothenburg. The others were also professionals: dentists, doctors and
pharmacists. During our conversation, they told me that most of them had_grown up
in modest circumstances, and their parents had all been affiliated with the
Naqshbandiyya order. The order had promised to take care of the children 's education
and would in exchange give them religious instruction in the tradition of the order,
making pious members out of them. As a consequence of this conversation, I undertook to study the social reproduction of this religious order - the strategies the order
has adopted in order to respond to the development of modern society and thereby
establish its position in Syria. Since that meeting in 1995, I have been collecting
information about the Naqshbandiyya, primarily on the present state and status of the
order in Damascus. I have also maintained contact with the order and recently, in
M ay 1997, I was the guest of the Ab u al-Nur Islamic Foundation (majma' Abi al-Nıir
al-IslP,miya) in the Rukn al-Din-area, a northern part of the city.ı The Abu al-Nur
Islamic Foundationisa trust that has its headquarters in the Abu an-Nur mosq1;1e, and
at this mosque the elderly sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, head of one branch of the
Naqshbandiyya in Daınascus and the Grand mufti of Syria, performs once a week.
He presents his dars (an informal serınon explaining the significance of a Qur'anic
text) every Friday moming in front of about 7000 people.

Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to outline how a branch of the Naqshbandi order in
Damascus confronts social change in the Iate 20th century. I want to focus in particu1 The visit was supported by a generous grant from
Humanilies and Social Sciences.
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lar on how a Süfi order acts to establish and srrengthen its role by presenting an
image of stability and traditionalism in a world of change. At the same time I want
to highlight how Islam is interpreted to avoid marginalization. This includes additional attenrion to the social organization of the order and its relation to the political
and economic life of Syria. as well as the everyday conduct of life by Syrians.
A second purpose of this paper is to elucidate the complex relationship berween
different form s of "Islam," especially the relation between Sufısm and interpretations
of "Islam" as generally seen by the traditionally educated Muslim scholars. The
larter connection is particularly important, since the understanding of "Islam" and
Sufısm isofren founded on simplistic stereotypes. Ina place !ike Damascus it is. obvious ho w different interpretations of Islam compete and a diversity of opinions exists
among the traditionally educated Muslim scholars on the "true" meaning of Islam or
the interpretation of Islamic terminology selected from a Quranic context.
Accordingly, throughout this discussion "Islam" is vi e wed as an on-going discourse
where different trends are engaged in struggle, and where the successful cantender
becomes, for the time being, the established tradilion, until it is challenged by yet
another trend.2 This is a situarian where many "Islams" fıght to become the One
Islamic Tradition.J A presupposition for such a view is the idea that contemporary
religious scholars in general, irrespecrive of rheir position in society and their standards as scholars, in most cases do not acknowledge the existence of contending
positions, each striving for symbolic dominance. Instead, their interpretations of the
Qur'an and sunna, their work as Muslim scholars, are reflections of debates, discussions
and developments in the society at large.4 Religion is in such an understanding intimarely related to - and part of - society. Toward the end of this paper, I will offer
some reflections on the ideas of modernity and globalization in relation to this branch
of the Naqshbandiyya and the attempt to carve out a space for the order in contemporary Syria. One inceresting question in this cantext is whetber or not this particular branch is undergoing change from a religious organization to an economic, political and social organization with strong religious underpinnings.5 In a Turkish serting
it has been noted that such a transformatian can lead to the decline of branches or
entire orders. For example, in a situation where the order becomes more of a commercial network than a spiritual fratemity, there is a risk that the bonds that tie the
organization together are lost.6 Yet, the role of Sufism can be one of combining the
2 Daniel Brown expressesi ı ina similar way sıaıing ıhaı in this process Muslims "are engaged in
an ongoing process of rctlıiııkillg ıhe ıradiıions in which they panicipaıe. Same, of course, deny any
connection wiıh the ıradiıion, and others deny that their :ıcıiviıy can be called 'rethinking,' preferring
to see it as Lhe revival or preservaıion of some ideal and unchanging model. Noneıheless, even the most
radical opponenıs of ıradiıion are not deparıing from the ıradiıion, but molding it and seeking to lay
claim to the authenticity it bestows. Likewise, even the most conservaıive defenders of Iradition cannot he ip but reshape the very ır::ıdition that they seek to preserve unchanged." See Brown. ı 996, p. 3f.
3 For a development and usage of this ideaona larger nıaıerial, see Stenberg, 1996. From a believer's
perspective one can always argue that this is an expressian of the complexity of monoıheism having
to dowith a unity anda pluralily that alw:ıys exists in a reli.gion.
4 That the view of Sufısm as strictly organized forrns of mysticism is outdated has been pointed
out by many, for example by Jo-Ann Gross (1988), and the need for studies of other roles of Sufısm
in society has been stressed by Annemaric Schimmel (1975). In the case of NaqslıbwıdZı·a Hamid
Algar ( 1990) re marks that most earlier work on the order has been historically and philologic:ılly oriented. Therefore, Lhe present aniele can be seen as an auempı to view Sufısm and religion asa part of
society in a sensethat can be seen in Gilsenan, 1973; and Johansen, 1996.
5 For a similar process among Naqshbandiyya in Turkey, see the article by Hakan Yavuz in this book.
6 This possibility of decline has alsa been poinıed out by Hakan Yavuz. It can al so be noted that
PeterBeyerin his Rcligioıı and Globalizatimı ( 1994) views the ıransforrnaıion of rcligious organizations and movemenıs in general inıo main Iy coınmercia l and/or political neıworks as :.ı problem undermining the ir legitimacy, see Beyer 1994, pp. 97-109.
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Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, Damascus (Jonas Onerbeck, 1997}.

various opportunities at hand while prespering in the contemporary society. For
exaınple, the Naqshbandiyya stress both the importance of piety for the individual as
well as the need for modem education.7 It should be noted by the reader that my
presence among the Naqshbandis probably affected their responses, since I am a
European outsider. This paper is also the result of preliminary research and jt is
primarily based on a reading of literature on the Naqslıbandiyya and conversations
with members of one particular branch of theorderin Damascus. Consequently, the
character of the piece is impressionistic.s In addition my interaction was entirely with
men. How female members of the order react to current trends is outside my
purview.9

The Setting
During the 20th century, Syria has been ruled by various groups of elites such as
landlords, a merchant class and a military establishment. Each of them has acted in
consent with a hierarchical and patriarchal power structure based on belonging to a
certain family and/or a religious organization. According to Volker Perthes, it was
after the lakeover of the forrner defense minister Hafiz al-Asad in 1970 (he assumed
presidential powers in 1971) that political institutions developed anda stable political structure emerged. ı o It was maintained, one could add, by an enorrnous security
7 Sufism, and mystics in the history of Sufism, can also play a role in which it reminds Muslims
of the ırue path. In A Woman and lıer Şıifis (1995) Fedwa Malti-Douglas analyses a book by the
Egypıian television personality Kariman Hamza. In Hamza's personal religious revival aset of his tarical mystics play a distinctive role in guiding her.
8 The relaıionship between the researcher and the researched has been much discussed, parıicu
larly in the field of anthropology. I am aware of the fact that this relation may need more attention in
this parıicular paper, but due to the limiıs of space I leave that discussion out here.
9 lı is appropriaıe ıo express my gratitude ıo the people I have meet in Damascus for their help
and hospitality, bul al so for the fruitful discussions we have had of which I hope there is mo re to come.
1O Perthes, 1995, p. 3. Anather study of the politics of Syria is Nikolaos van Dam's Tfıe Struggle
for Power in Syria. Politics and Society under Asod and tlıe Bat/ı Party (l996).
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apparatus. Since ai-Asad seized power, the country has been going through a set of
economic as well as political changes. Economic success in the first part of the 1970s
was followed by recession and a general dissatisfaction with corruption, economic
disparities, repression, alienation from power, ete. This !ed to political unrest that
culminated in the infamous Hama massacre of 1982. The period between the mid1960s and 1982 is sametimes portrayed asa power struggle between the old Sunni
establishment and the relatively new group of 'Alawi elite. ı ı Throughom the 1980s,
the country had severe economic problems. The downfall of important trading partners such as the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe forced
the Syrian government to change its economic as well as political policy. Of course,
changes of economic and political policies are also influenced by the concerns of the
Syrian government regarding its relations with neighboring countries. Furtherrnore,
it should be noted that although Syria is a parliamentary democracy, according to the
constitution, the country has never carried out any form of free elections or allawed
for an open public debate on political issues.ıı Yet, decision-making in general in
Syria appears to be carried out relatively independently and is not influenced by
foreign actors in the same way as in many other countries in the region.t3 Hence, a
critique of the statement of Ferthes above on stable political srructures concems the
absence of a political debate and the impossibiliry of establishing political parties. The
value of stable political strucrures maintained by a strong security apparatus can, I
thin.k, be questioned, when politics in a wide sense is practiced by informal networks
outside the formal structures. In this context, the Naqshbandiyya have an opportuniry
in Syrian sociery to act as a channel of political and/or economical action.
In today's Syria, societal change takes place on several planes. The country has
during the last decade entered the "global village," as values and norrns which previously were held to be self-evident in Syrian society came to be questioned. One
example is the remodeling of family structures. Womens' ascribed roles are less
clear-cut than they used to be. There is also a gap between generations in terms of
values and aspirations in life. Changes have also taken place very concretely in the
Syrian economy. The Soviet Union, previously Syria's main trading partner, no
langer exists. The Syrian economic model, whereby the state exercised far-reaching
control and directly owned major companies, is now undergoing a major restructuring.
Syria is trying to establish ties with Europe, North America and some South East
Asian countries. Likewise, transnational companies are playing an ever greater role.
For example, the cars in Damascus have changed in recent years from old American
cars to new and mostly Japanese cars, and companies !ike Benetton have established
shops in the heart of the city. Advertising billboards for a mass of different products
compete with posters of Ha·fız al-Asad and his son Basil.14 A new entrepreneurial
class is arnassing considerable wealth and spending it on new Mercedes auromobiles,
at luxury hotels, or at the few night clubs in the center of Damascus. At the same
time, a large number of people li ve in poverty, and are forced to have several jobs to
make ends meet. In this process of massive change, traditionally educated religious
ll Throughout this paper, I will use the term 'Aiawi to designale the group that seized power in
the coup of 1970. The group is sametimes called Nusoyrio, a term which places iL outside the Muslim
community. 1 have no intention here of taking part in the debate surraunding these two terms. For a
short, general introduction to the history of the group, see Pipes, 1990, pp. 159- 188.
12 For an amusing description of how Syrians far away from the power struggles in Damascus
vi e w the elections to the People's Assembly of the country, see Rugh, 1997, pp. l ı Of.
13 Perthes, 1995. p. 3.
14 Even the cult of Basil has been the subject of a recenl governmental decree. The message of
the decree is that the cu lt of Basil who died in acar accident in 1993 has gone to far and has to be, at
least, limited.
·
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leaders, such as sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro, 15 who !ike to present himselfas the highest
representative of the Naqshbandi .order in the Syrian-Lebanese region, attempt to
establish the ir position and that of the ir order. Nevertheless, discussions of the effects
of modem phenomena is not new in Syria. It has been going on for many years and
the introduction of the telegraph, railway and telephone was discussed and seen by
some as dangerous. Yet, I consider the recent technological and economic developments to be of a more radical character, changing the structure of the society deeply
and involving alarger part of the population than was the case with the earlier technological innovations.

Naqshbandiyya - a Religious Order in Syrian Society
Many directions within Islam are, of course, represented in Syria. Approximately
75% of the population are Sunni Muslims.l6 From a histerical point of view, .Sunni
Islam has for centuries been associated with political and economic power in Syrian
society. Within the Syrian Sunni community the Naqshbandiyya- the order from the
East - and Shadhiliya - the order from the West, have been the largest Süfı orders
throughout the 20th century. In the case of Naqshbandiyya, the presence of the order
in Greater Syria, according to Frederick de Jong, goes back to the 17th century when
a ziiwiya, dervish lodge, was established in Jerusalem. De Jong also states that the
order was introduced in Syria proper in the end of the 17th century,l? The most
important histerical figure in the history of the order in Damascus was sheikh KhiHid
(d. 1827), and all contemporary branches of the Naqshbandiyya in the city have
sheikhs with a silsila going back to Khalid.l8 His tomb is relatively close to the Abu
an-Nur mosque in the Rukn al-Din area of Damascus. Much eleser to the mosque is
the tom b of Ibn 'Arabi and one supposes that sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro chose to s tay at
this less fashionable mosque in order to control the tombs, especially the latter one.
Another reason is thalthe Rukn al-Din area has a Kurdish heritage.
In the recently published edition Les Voies d' Allah (1996) Pierre-Jean Luizard
states that the Kaftariyya branch was founded in the 1960s.ı9 This date is not supported by any reference, but presumably Luizard's understanding of the Kaftariyya
is built on de Jong's idea about when the branch was established.20 In the historiography of the branch itself it seems to be irnportant to highlight that the spirituallegacy is much older and in the biography of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro it is said that he took
over the role of head of the Naqshbandi order after the death of his father in 1938.2 1
During my Iast visit in the Abu al-Nur mosque, I was shown the tomb of the father
of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro. Sheikh Muhammad Amin Kuftaro, the father, was buried
in one of the six burial-places in the tomb. Three places were empty, and in the other
15 I am here using the spelling of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro's name that to my knowledge is the one
he uses in English and other European languages.
ı 6 All figures of this kin d are unreliable due to the political sensitiveness of the numbers and the
fact that no reliable cansensus exist. Different religious communities frequently adopt figures that are
most positive to themselves.
17 de Jong, 1990, p. 592.
18 lbid., p. 594.
19 Luizard, 1996, p. 364.
20 See de Jong, 1990, p. 600.
21 The long history of the Kuftaro family in Damascus can be read in the bibliography on the life
of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro of which the fırst edition was published in 1992. Unfortunately, it is not of
my knowledge how sheikh Kuftaro received his permission to be aleader of the branch. This is to say
that! don't know if he is both the highest representative and the spiritual leader.
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two the son of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro, sheik.h Zahir, and the first wife of Ahmed
Kuftaro are buried. The fact that sheikh Amin is the subject of a religious cult, especia!ly when it occurs in the Abu al-Nur complex, appears to fit well with the historiographical ambitions of the order. Of course, it may be obvious that the specific
branch, Naqshbandiyya-Kaftariyya, was established as an independent sub-branch in
the 1960s and that the Kuftaros earlier belonged to anather branch. However, in the
historiography of the order itself the order appears to be deliberately unclear on this
point in order to give their branch legitimacy and status. In any event, it is clear from
sheikh Kuftaro's biography that it was he who developed a small mosque in what
was the outskirts of Damascus into a large mosque complex containing a libraiy,
reading rooms, classrooms and offices. This is to say that even though the father
sheikh Amin is upgraded in terms of status, the Naqshbandiyya-KafHiriyya is
extremely focused on the person sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro.
As stated above, the grand mufti, sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro, is an influential Sunni
Muslim in contemporary Syria.22 The grand mufti holds the highest official religious
positions in the country, and it should be noted that he can be deseribed both asa traditional religious authority and as the leader of a sufi order. This is certainly not
unique and there are many examples in the history of Sufısm where sheiks have been
part of a formal religious hierarchy as well as taking an active part in public life in
generai.23 Anather contemporary and neighboring example within the Naqshbandiyya is sheikh Muhammad Nazim Adil al-Haqqani an-Naqshbandi. He is a
Naqshbandi sheikh, but a!so a scholar in shari'a and he claims to be the mufti of
Turkish Cyprus. Sheik.h Nazim al-Haqqani spent some time in Syria and both of
them are very active in presenting themselves on the Internet and both have started
institutes, or claim affiliation to institutes, in the U.S. During one of my visits to
Damascus, during the spring of 1995, I had the opportunity to see how these roles
could coexist without sharp boundaries. During a dars held by sheikh Kuftaro before
the Friday prayer in his "own" mosque, many visitors from Lebanon were present.
As Naqshbandi members, they had specifically come to hear sheikh Kuftaro speak.
Many of them were moved to tears by hearing him expound on the meaning of
Qur'anic verses. His speech concerned the relationship between religions, especially
Christianity and Islam, and what attitude Muslims should take toward natural sciences. Sheikh Kuftaro's speech was marked by a rhetoric usually associated with
Sufism, but was presented in a traditional mosque setting. When he had entered the
mosque as well as when he left the room, many of the !isteners tried to to uch him and
then pass their hand over their mouth and heart. That is a way of transferring sheikh
Kuftaro's power, his baraka, to their own bodies. Later, after the prayer and the
klmfba, guests were gathered ina room to enjoy the company of the sheikh anda cup
of tea. The young men from Lebanon looked very happy. They smiled and sametimes they seemed to be moved to tears again by the words of their sheik.h. All this
appeared to be commonplace and natural to the adherents. In this way, the boundaries between the official position of grand mufti and the function as the leader of a
mystical fratemity were effaced. Apart from this more obvious role as a spiritual
leader sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro and his foundation have other interesrs of social, political and economic character.
In general, the Naqshbandiyya order is deseribed as having a great interest in poli22 In 1946, at the age of 31 , sheikh Kuftaro was a founding member of the League of Muslim
scholars. He was appointed Mufti of Damascus in 1951 and in 1958 he became the firsL mufti of
Damascus and a member of the supreme council of fa/lvii (majlis al-ifta). Sheikh Kuftaro was elected
grand mufti in 1964. He is alsa a member of the supreme council of ıvaqf (mnjlis al-awqiij).
23 See, for example, Gross, 1988.
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tics and in secular power. In
the Syrian context, the interpretation of de Jo.ng is that the
support from the govemrnent
of the Kaftariyya branch has to
dowith the regime's interest in
underrnining the influence of
local NaqsJıbandl leaders in
various parts of the country.24
In his double role as grand
~/-·'_ .:·
,{. - --~
mufti and sheikh of a Sufi
t
• .. .:
order, sheikh Kuftaro wields
political influence. He can
influence people and his support is important when the govemment wishes to impose a
controversial decision. Sheikh
Kuftaro may be allied with - or
even controlled - by the Syrian
regime, but he can also influence the political teadership
through his position as the
highest religious authority of a
large religious movement. In
Cover of Sheikh Ah mad Kufıaro's beStSeller from 1997.
the same way, his support of a
Sunnl Muslim opposition would give that opposition considerable legitimacy.
However, the latter is unlikely.
In general, the informal networks of Sufism is sometimes seen as a problem by
various regimes. The support of one specific branch can be utilized in order to undermine other branches. It is a well known fact that a sheikh has vast influence among
members of the order. Should this influence transiate in to political activity, it can
become a direct threat. This has indeed occurred in the past, yet the orders usually
confıne their activities to an apolitical arena. Their political activities seem tied to economic issues. Sufi orders exchange goods and services and this Syrian Naqshbandl
branch administrates a trust, the Abu al-Nur Islamic foundation, established in 1971.
Yet, trusts have been set up under various names since the beginning of the 1950s. In
all probability, the ineome seems to come primarily from private donations. The trust
offers courses in Arabic for foreign students. Many of the foreign students are from
Central Asia and presumably many of them are related to various Naqshbandiyya
branches in their home countries. In such a way, an international network is maintained. However, one of the foremost ambitions of the foundation is to became an
established and recognized center of Islamic teaming in general, and Abu !il-Nur is
developing its educational connections with different universities in the Muslim
world, such as universities in Lebanon, Pakistan and Sudan, but also in North
America.25 In general, education at Abu al-Nur is free of charge. Another example of

.

24 de Jong, 1990.
25 The Abu al-Nur foundation host.s four branches of four foreign universities. They also have a
four year educaıion- Kulliya Da'wa al-lslamiya- was established in 1982. This was followed by the
establishment of the Kulliya Uşıil al-Din in 1992. Today the tatter have more than !00 students for
M.A. degree and recently the first studenıs have sıarted their education for a Ph.D. in Islamic law. In
1993 or 1994 sheikh Kufıaro opened the Abu al-Nur Institute for Islamic Studies and Arabic
Languages in Balıimore, Maryland.
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how the foundation is devetoping in areas not commonly related to Sufism is the travel
ageney operared by one prominent member. The foundation has developed a very
effective organization in various fields such as economics, social activities and politics. In relation to politics, members of the Syrian parliament have been clearly linked
to sheikb Kuftaro. He has managed to develop the Kaftariyya branch into a powerful
position in Syrian society, especially since he is the representative of offical Islam in
the country. Thisisa work irnpossible to carry out without a political talent. The policy of the regirne, to favor one of the Naqshbandiyya branches in the country, has been
effectively used by the Kaftanyya, a situation emphasized by sheikh Kuftaro's role as
mufti. Sheik.h Kuftaro is also seen as constituting a balance towards a Wahhabi influence in Syria. Moreover, the interpretation of Islam made by sheikh Kuftaro fits very
well with the political aims of the al-Asad government and it is possible that the "ecumenical" aspect of his interpretation has been emphasized since he was chosen as
grand mufti. 26 The "ecumenical" aspect refers to the sheikh' s perception that the three
Abrahamic religions stern from a commen ground, a view commonly found among
contemporary liberal Christian theologians. Ina larger context he appears to view all
religions as just different traditions of the one universal religion, and he tries to avoid
making value judgments on the different religions. Yet, his presentations of Islam in
texts and in lectures reveal that his idea is that Islam is the final and most perfect tradition. One consequence of this understanding is that it legitimizes current Syrian
rulership by an 'Alawl president, since it includes that specific tradition in the framework of Islam.27 Seen from this perspective the generalizations by de Jong, but especially Luizard, on the position of sheikh Kuftaro in Syria seem simplistic.
Accordingly, he is, in my opinion, more than a puppet in the hands of the govemment
even ff he enjoys little credibility among many Sunni Syrians.

Ritual and Islarnic Terminology
In terms of religious rituals- mainly dhikr - the Kaftariyya are arranged ina hierarchy of circles. The most prominent ones cannot be visited by non-Muslims. Every
circle contains a sort of internal hierarchy and there is mobility upwards. Some
people in the order, like some of the persons who are close to sheikh Kuftaro, move
areund and visit the different circles. Their task is to control, advise and inspire
younger members of the order. On so me occasions there have been conflicts between
teaders of various circles and other leaders have to act as mediators.
In general, sheikh Kuftaro utilizes the Islamic terminology in a fashion comman
to religious leaders in many Muslim societies - among Sufis as well as Islarnists. One
example, taken from his lectures, is his conceptualization of lıidjra. He states that the
term has to do with the cheice human beings have in t~e modem world. One has to
make a choice between the good and the evi! (on this point sheikh Kuftaro refers to
26 The ecumenical theme is stressed in the collection of speeches published in English, see
Kuftaro, 1993, as well as in his Friday lectures. It is a possibility that the ecumenical ıheme was
further emphasized after the takeover of Hafız ai-Asad in 1970.
27 The matter of whether or not the 'Aiawis are Muslim s is, of course, important ıo Hafiz ai-Asad
and the'Alaıvi elite. The ruling of the famous classical scholar lbn Taymiyya (d. 1328) saying that the
'Aiawis are heretics has caused the regime problems. In the beginnings of the 1970s the govemment
tıied to change the constirution ıo a text which allows Syria to have a non-Muslim as presiden ı. Afıer
massive protesıs this was withdrawn. ln addition, in 1973 the regime asked the famous Lebanese Slıi"a
scholar Musa Sadr for afatwö on ilhe status of the 'Aiawis as Muslimsor not. Not very surprisingly he
ruled in favor of the 'Aiawis and declared them to be in the mainsırcam of shi'ism. The Syrian president al so takes part in the sermoıns in the Umayyad mosque in the center of Damascus or in a mosque
close to the presidential palace. particularly on religious holidays.
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Cain and' Abel). Humanity should do a Jıidjra to Allah and not between geographical
places !ike Mecca or Medina. Therefore, lıidjra means, according to sheikh Kuftaro,
to tum to Allah and follow the example of Muhammad. To co n ceptualize well known
terms such as hidjra as a state of mind or principle instead of a specific histarical
event is a method used by Muslim scholars. In recent times the many different
lslamist trends as well as others taking part in the present search for the "true" nature
of Islam utilize this method in constructing interpretations.
The man.y references to Biblical stories seems to be part of a lifelong project of
sheikh Kuftaro to be part of the Muslim-Christian dialogue. A key element in his references to the Bible is the idea of the three monotheistic religions as derived of a
common origin. On one occasion I, therefore, asked sheikh Kuftaro sornewhat naiveIy if it was possible for me as a nominal Christian to study the spiritual guidance of
Islam at the foundation and thereby receive the same education as the young men
taken care of by the order. His answer, taken from a text by lbn 'Arabi, contained
two parts: The fırst was that Muhammad was only one brick, the last brick, ina large
building; the second was that religion is like a large table and God serves a variety
of dishes . The duty of sheikh Kuftaro is to serve humanily the dishes. These answers
contain sornewhat cryptic messages. My interpretation is that it is possible for me to
take part in the education, but only to a certain extent.

"Strategies" for Spreading the Message of Islam ıs
The Abu al-Nur foundation also has its own security organization linked to certain
branches of the Syrian security apparatus and the members are very careful with the
information they hand out to people not involved in the order. This caution takes
many forms. In a bookshop, I asked a member of the order who accompanied me
about a song which was performed during a ritual and he quickly replied, that we
(members of the branch) don't talk about such things in public. Another example,
concems the history of the order. We were ina house in the Rukn al-Din area and we
were standing on a balcony of an apartment on the 8th floor. Our view was fantastic.
W e overlooked the Abu al-Nur mosque, but also the tom bs lbn 'Arabi and sheikh
Kha!Id. I asked a young member of the order about the history of the Kuftaro family and their relation to sheikh Khalid. He answered that he did not know at w hat time
the Kuftaro family came to Damascus and he had nothing in particular to say about
the relationship between the Kuftaros and Khalid. I continued on the subject and
reflected on the meaning of history and asked him if he thinks it is possible that one
can Jeam from history and/or specifıc persons in history. He answered that of course
one can Jearn from history, but mostly in terms of ethics. He stressed, in the same
manner as sheikh Kuftaro usually does in his lectures at the mosque, the importance
of interpreting Islam in relation to the present. For example, histerical persons, such as
sheikhAhmadSirhindi, can give us guidance and inspiration in mostly ethical and moral
matters and are not to be followed - so to speak - down to the last letter. The point,
often repeated by sheikh Kuftaro and his followers, is that Muslims should not be
locked into a specifıc interpretation of Islam. Instead they should be guided by reason,
and, my friend told me, sheikh Kuftaro often says that religion is "mature reason."

of

28 I am fully aware of the methodological questions that can be raised canceming many of the
statements made in this part. It is, of course, difficult to make general statements on the basis of
answers that may have been delivered with a certain intention. However, I refer to the idea of this
article as impressionistic and reflecting my personal impressions.
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The openness towards interpretation, the emphasis on ethics and morality and the idea
of religion as marure reason was the most comman theme in my discussions with
young members of the order. This reflected their understanding of religion as partly
"lost" in modem society. This was supplemented by statements that says that if we
look at things scientifically we will understand that Islam is the true religion.
Naturally, the themes reflect the teachings of sheikh Kuftaro. In discussions ranging
from the moral decline of the so-called West to the relation between Islam and science,
I was nearly always able to come up with a quorarion or a slightly modified interpretation of sheikh Kuftaro. This caused amusemenr, but also some reflection and respect
that I was ab le to express myself by the help of the words of sheikh Kuftaro.
The conversation on a balcony at the home of one of my hosts in Damascus, also
revealed a part of the organization of the Abu al-Nur foundation. It is my im pressian
that the foundation has a very active da 'wa department. They have different strategies to receive various types of visitors and even assign a host to guide visitors.
Persons that are judged as presumptive converts to Islam appear to be treated according
to a certain scheme which encourages them to take the fina! step and convert.29 The
schemes appear ro be tailor-made for the different individuals. I have been
approached and put undersome pressure to take part in dlıikr. My host at one time
told me that it is just a matter of mediration and I accepted. We gathered early one
moming in the house of one of the spiritual guides close to sheikh Kuftaro. After the
session, that went on for about half an hour, the person who led the dlıikr asked me
ho w I fe lt. I answered that I felt relaxed, but nothing mo re. He then asked if I experienced anything particular at the time during the dlıikr when he laid his hand on my
shoulder. I answered no and he explained to me, and to the others, that although I had
not experienced anything a flower had been planred in my heart and now it was a
matter of cultivation. He added, that I was now personally responsible for continuing
the cultivation of the flower and he recommended half an hour of mediration everyday. His instructions to me were that I should practice a silent dlıikr in which I should
focus on silently repeating the name of Allah in my heart.30 He invited me to contact
him at any time in order to receive consultancy on personal experiences in relation
to dlıikr. Thereafter, he quickly served coffee and showed us his new TV and all the
cable channels he could tune in. We watched a news program broadcasted by an
Israeli channel. After this occasion I refused to take part in any form of ritual. That
decision was clearly disappointing to some of my young friends in the order.
Naturally, this is not stated publicly, but to me it is clear that the da 'wa department
of the foundation is very well aware of how to develop psychological strategies promoting the individual to convert.
On a larger scale the da 'wa department works with the specific message of sheikh
Kuftaro. The intent of this activity is to present the sheikh to a larger international
audience. This is done by printing his lectures in English. A book was firstly printed
in 1993, but was recently reprinted and enlarged.31 In general, the book is focused
upon three interrelated themes; the first concems the "ecumenical". character of
sheikh Kuftaro's message mentioned above. ~e often refers to the Bible and Qur'an
29 The classical Sufi idea is that the spiritual path of a parıicular order is presenıed to the newcomer and iı is up to him or her ıo accept the path. Hence, persons are not, at leası ideally, encouraged
to take ıhe fınal step and become a member of the order.
30 Many symbolic meanings are aııached to the heart. Within the Naqshbandi order in general, the
heart of a disciple who reaches a higher knowledge of God as the only reality is united or linked to th~:
heart of his or her sheikh. In the case of sheikh Kuftaro, his followers believe that he can grant them
entrance to the Paradise.
31 I received some chapters of the new edition during my visitin Damascus in M ay 1997 and the
finished book in November.
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to point out the comman history of Muslims, Christians and Jews. For instance, the
shared history and histarical figures are a foundation for cooperation between believers
of the three monotheistic religions. Secondly, he stresses that the predicaments of the
contemporary Muslim world are to be blamed, at least partly, on false interpretations
of Islam.32 If people interpreted Islam in a correct manner- guided by reason - the
problems of the world will be solved.33 The latter is a classical statement in the
history of Islam and emphasized among contemporary Islamists. Thirdly, the understanding ofisiarn in relation to the society must be understood, and this would enable
us to understand it differently in different times. The latter interpretation appears as
a way of us ing ijtihiid (here in a general meaning of reinterpretation) in order to adapt
to the changing realities of Syrian society. The fact that the book was first published
in English can be seen asa part of a mission to establish sheikh Kuftaro as an authority on Islam on the global level. His followers are also active, for example, in Muslim
student organizations in North America arid try to propagate their understanding of

Islam.3 4 Since his first visitin 1966, sheikh Kuftaro has toured the United States on
several occasions and recently lectured there. However, he recently took a decision
not to travel any more due to his poor health.

Creating an Organization for the Future
One strategy, which has been mentioned above·, is to financially support talented
young men. The Kaftariyya allows female membership and children to enter the
order. However, I am not aware of any systematic effort to spansor education of
young women. On the ınale side, however, the branch will pay for education, but will
also endeavor to inculcate its religious values, so that these young men y.'ill become
new - or so to speak "better" and active - members of the order. This method of
enrolling young men and paying for their education is designed to create a network
of highly educated individuals who belong to the branch and who will "combat," or
control, change in Syrian society _35 It is at least a conscious strategy to create new
members, who are able to handie the encounter with modemity.. One symptom of this
is the fact that the Kaftariyya chooses to finance modem, professional education, for
example, in medicine, dentistry, engineering and pharmacy - which lead to professions with high status in Syrian society and which in themselves imply an acceptance
of modemity and its new ways of thinking. At the same time, this in some ways
implies a change in the interpretation of what constitutes tradition and cultural heritage. An example is the fact that sheikh Kuftaro's sermons are. filmed and that the
Abu al-Nur complex contains recording facilities. Subsequently, the lectures can be
purchased on videotape or on audio cassette. Another example is the position of some
of the close relatives of sheikh Kuftaro. They are not traditional religious scholars, but,
for example, are engineers who have received their education in Europe or North
America. They are nevertheless active members of this NaqshbaJJ:di branch and are
32 Anather theme in the lectures of sheikh Kuftaro is his discussion of environmental issues.
33 The term reason ('aql) has a w ide ran ge of meanings. In this.context the term should be understood as the understanding of Islam presented by sheikh Kuftaro. Hence, two important elements in
the ıeachings of sheikh Kuftaro related to ıhe meaning of the term are his stress on the possibility of
reinterpreting Islam and on non-violence. The latter can be seen as a critique of Islamists.
34 The Homepages on the Internet presenting sheikh Kuftaro are controlled by the order in
Damascus, but it is monitored from Websites in the U.S.
35 Yet, it is not entirely new and, for example, the above mentioned sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani has
an M.A. in chemical engineering from Istanbul University. At the same time as he was studying chemical engineering he was studying slıari'a and the Arabic language.
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well versed in the teachings of it, holding high positions in the hierarchical system.
My hypothesis is that they constirute a new generatian of Jeaders, and that they
are the driving force in 'the endeavor to send young men to Europe and North
America. It should be noted that this is done ata time when foreign influence and socalled Westem culture is condemned by many people in the Middle East in general,
especially in the rhetoric of Islaınist movements. As a paraHel to the more worldly or
secular education, the young men are also given a religious education at the Abu alNur foundation. The result is that most of the srudents have a double competence.
They have degrees, on one hand in civil engineering and on the other an M.A. in
slıari'a law or in the Arabic language. As noted above, the foundation has recently
started a Ph.D. program in Islamic law. However, the courses given at Abu al-Nur
foundation give the student a master's degree in either religious subjects or in the
Arabic language. Once their education is completed, some of these men enter key
positions, or they have the potential to do so in the furure, especially in Syrian society where highly educated professionals are scarce. Yet, during my visitin 1997 some
of the young men complained about the inadequate possibilities for working as civil
engineers or pharmacists. One of them, a pharmacist by training, had instead set up
a computer business. He was economically supported by the order. Talented young
men can also be sent for further education abroad, either to specialize or receive a
Ph.D. They are then, on their returo to Syria, able to work for their order, and they
can all be mobilized in a erisis situation.

Naqshbandiyya- Modernity and Globalization
In Syria, as in many other countries in the Middle East, processes of modemization are sametimes perceived as threats to Islam. The first steps towards a stage of
modemity was related to the ideas of, for example, the national state, technical modernization, industrialization and a state based on stable values and norms. In alater phase,
the process of modemization portrays a society undergoing rapid change, where no
values remain constant - a mobile world with unclear norms, where the traditions and
models to foUow are diffuse. The possibilities of communication and the development of transnational companies also undermine earlier ideas of a stable and secure
world.36 Within the Naqshbandiyya-Kaftariyya it is comman to deseribe this fragmented mode of existence as devastating, as a situation where the social equilibrium
is threatened. For the members of the order, the solution lies ina returo to re-ligion
and to the fınn values and norms represented by religion. As has been stated above,
a comman statement is that Islam represents the narural order of things and this fact
can be un derstood in a scientific manner. Despite members' perception of their order
as stable and in:ımutable, it is clear that the Naqshbandls reinterpret Islam to canfront
change in society. The aim appears to create what Anthony Giddens has deseribed as
an ontological security.37 Various events, local as well as international, ·affect the
way the Naqshbandis interprets the Islamic tradition in order to support its daim of
representing stability. At the same time, modem technology- the Internet- is used ro
present sheikh Kuftaro 's understanding of Islam. The modem communications systems make it possible for the head of a local Naqshbandiyya branch to be part of a
global discourse on the function of Islam. The possibility of presenting Islam on a
36 For a thorough discussion on the modes and Icvels of modemizaıion, modernity and modernism, see Fornas, 1995, pp. 38ff.
37 Giddens, 1991, pp. 92ff.
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global level has been noted by many as a new phenomenon, impossible a century
ago, and this mayhave a unifying effect. Yet, the paradox is that Muslims are also
exposed to a variety of local Muslim cultures and to the cultures of North America
and Europe.J8 To a certain degree, it appears that several global Islamic messages are
competing for influence in the contemporary world. Hence, the idea of a single normative Islam seems to be as unreachable as ever. It is not unimaginable, however, that
the message of sheikh Kuftaro, trying to bridge a perceived gap between religions
sharing a cqmmon ground, will have some success. One can argue that the
Naqshbandiyya-Kaftariyya represents a new trend in which traditionally educated
scholars and their movements use the means of modem society to regain influence
among those who interpret Islam, but also amongMuslimsin general. Their main targer is, of course, the interpretations of Islam made by various Islamİst groups.
Ona locallevel, social and economic conditions in Syria can be frustrating. A high
school teaeber may have to have a second job, e.g., as a fruit juice vendor, to be able
to support his family. Many educated people leave Syria in order to begin a new life
in North America or Europe. There isa widespread dream of a better material life in
Europe or the US, and the European visitor is often approached with requests to help
Syrians emigrate. The chances of getting married are for many young men rather slim,
especially for those who are not the eldest son in their family, the son for whom the
family can afford topaya dowry. Girls study at the university, not primarily to get an
education or to find a suitable marriage partner, but to postpone marriage. Naqshbandl
leaders are aware of these facts and they use all possible means to take an advantage
of the situation. People also co me to the branch of a combination of reasons and so me
of them has nothing to do with piety. One example of a strategy developed to strenghten
the branch is that one of the relatively young leaders of the order is responsible for a
project designed to develop an Internet in Syria and he is the producer of the
Homepage on sheikh Kuftaro. Another example is sheikh Kuftaro's idea that he
would like to start a sarellite channel in order to compete wirh all the different channels available to Syrians. In a conversation with sheikh Kuftaro he expressed this as
an interest of vital concem.39 He considers the dissolution of traditional society to be
the root cause behind much of this social frustration, and he claims that the reason for
this dissolution is the loss of the influence of Islam. It appears that in the view of
sheikh Kuftaro a TV channel can be an important instruınent in getting society and
individuals back on the straight path. Another way of increasing the role of Islam
relates to the social organization of the branch. In my opinion, the picture of some
orders as a body of men - a club - can be a way of trying to imagine how the
Kaftariyya establishes an environment for their young members,40 a milieu with
sametimes a highly boyish atmosphere. The latter was especially clear to me in my
personal interaction with the young men of the order. In any circumstance the proposed solution to probleıns in society is to create a truly Islarnic society - a different
one, however, than called for by the Islamists. Yet, there are similarities in interpretation and usage between Islamisrs and Sufis. One example concems the texts they
read. Among the young men of the Kaftarlyya the ideas of, for exaınple, I:Iasan alBanna or the Yemeni sheikh al-Zindhiinl are very well known.4I In a Syrian context
38 This has been noted by, for example, Tumer, 1991, p. 17 ı. One interesting example is that the
legal cultures of North America and Europe have influenced conıemporary interpretations of slıari 'a .
39 In comparison Turkish Naqshbandis publish magazines, owns radio stations and have aTVchannel.
40 Hourani, 1981, p. 93.
41 Due to my interest in the relationship between Islam and modern science (see Stenberg, 19Y6),
I was given videos containing speeches by ai-Zindhani.
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one of the Jeaders of the local Muslim Brotherhood is often said to have a
Naqshbandiyya background. Yet, his name, Said Hawwa, was never mentioned to me.
One reason could have been the political sensitivity involved in discussing him.
However, a general note is that many religiously motivated and justified movements
among Muslims react to what is perceived as a problem, that is the marginalization of
their religious tradition. Of course, the young men might have been attracted by the
mystical elemen ts in the writings of al-Banna. Yet, their reading of his texts al so suggests that the analysis of the problems within Muslim societies in movements forming
a sort of political Sufism and moderate form s of Islam is m is not that large. Both mo vemen ts promote modemity in the form of a stable state and stable values and norms. In
some sense the ideal seems not to be far from the models of a welfare state developed
in many western European countries. However, the consequences of their analysis
differ, that is they differ in how to put their religious interpretation into action.

Final Note
The young men I communicate with often returo to the term nıujaddid or renewer
when they deseribe the ir idea of Islam. This is, of course, something they have been
taught by sheikh Kuftaro, and he often refers to this term.42 As conceptualized by
him and his disciples, the term means to retum to Qur'an andsımnain order to renew
or recreate Islam. However, in sheikh Kuftaro's understanding, the term relates not
only to a renewer. It also means the person who reactivates and authenticates the
truth in conformity with the contemporary world. Islam cannot be connected to a specific time or place in history, but must develop in accordance with the society. This
can be seen as a critique of the opinion of many religious scholars - 'ulama' - that
sheikh Kuftaro considers to be firmly riveted in aparticolar interpretation of Islam.
The method of carrying out this interpretation of Islam - ijtihad - means to re-read
the Qur'an and the swına, that is, to go back to the authentic sources of Islam. The
use of ijtilıad also enables sheikh Kuftaro to exercise influence on his followers'
understanding of Islam, and especially in his dars, he interprets Islam in a flexible
manner that serves to show that Islam is the ultimate order for the human being. His
critique is not only directed towards various brands of 'ulama' and Islamists. In, for
example, relation to other Sufi orders he says that they sometirnes go too far in various rituals. His general idea of Sufism is to go back to the term tazkiya, purifıcation.
In hjs translation the term means the purification of hearts and he states that this is
the original term denoting the practices that are today deseribed as Sufism. He also
uses zakat, usually understood as alıns ıax, in its meaning of purification. Both his
understanding of taıkiya and zakiit are commonly held ideas by many other Sufis. In
this manner he connects his form of Sufism with Qur'anic terms in order to ereare
another form of legitimization besides the silsila.
The emphasis the Kaftariyya put on social, economic and pelirical activities
strengthens the positioıı of the branch in soci_ety. Yer, the organization is facing many
threats. Sheikh Kuftaro and his followers are disliked by many Syrians, mostly
because they have a strong relation to the Syrian regime. In a way they have also
been copying methods used by the 'Alawis to gain influence, primarily education as
a tool for power. The argument that they are foreign , that is that they have a Kurdish
descendency, is also usedin the rhetoric of their opponents. But the greatest threat is

42 The carlier mentioned sheikh Nazim ai-Haqqani is
century by his followers.
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as the mujaddid of this

the fact that sheikh Kuftaro is 82 years old and after his death there is no clear successor. His leadership is charismatic in the W eberian sense, and he functions asa lens
for his community, interpreting and explaining the outside world.43 It is interesting
to note that although the role of the Sufi sheikh and the role of the mufti is mixed in
the mosque setting, tQ.e charisma of sheikh Kuftaro may have avoided institutionalization due to the possibility of keeping the charisma attached to his role as a sheikh.
Yer, one effect of his charismatic status is that the institutionalization of his leadership has not l:ıeen carried out, and one can easily imagine that after his death there
will be a power struggle within the branch that may lead to a split among different
less charismatic leaders. Of course, sheikh Kuftaro is weU aware of the situation and
the strategies needed to build up influence in many fields of society to keep his
followers together. To my knowledge, sheikh Kuftaro has not written a will and he
has not written any subsrantial text that can serve as an ideological guideline for the
branch after his death. Yet, many people takes notes on the dars every Friday and
they are recorded both on video and audio cassette. His speeches from variousconferences and public meetings are collected in a new and enlarged edition of Tlıe W ay of
Trutlı (1997). My interpretation is that the work to collect his sayings carried out
primarily by some of the younger leaders is done in order to ereare a corpus of
statements on Islam that can be used after the death of sheikh Kuftaro. The corpus of
statements will have a unifying purpose. However, one can also interpret the uncertainty as something desired by sheikh Kuftaro. There are examples in the history of
Sufism in which the sheikh supports a split. Usually, the reason is that the sheikh
wishes to abolish the bad parts of the order and make a prosperous ground for the
survivors.
Despite the belief that the order represents stability and traditional piety, the
Kaftariyya does in fact adapt to modemity, especially through its use of technology
and modern forms of education. In the encounter with modernity, Islamic tradition is
also reinterpreted. If we return to the conversation on the balcony, it is obvious that
a young, but relatively prominent member of the branch knows the silsila and the
history of his sheikh. The legitimization of the sheikh is usuaUy maintained through
the silsila, and the young man probably just kept this as a seeret from me. The
reason for this is difficult to understand, but one can easily irnagine that the many
years of living ina repressive state make people suspicious in general. In the end, one
can also add that it would not be inconceivable to think that if the Kaftariyya transform socially the branch will also transform its rituals and ideas. In the case of sheikh
Kuftaro it is my impression that his authority is connected to his message, that is the
ideas he expresses, especially in the dars. This is also manifested by the young men
who in conversations with me are very focused on the words of sheikh Kuftaro
and they quote him at length. Perhaps this is a sign of ho w authorization and ways to
legitimate Jeadership change in a changing society. This change takes place when
spiritual loyalty is justified by the help of "new" phenomena such as reason and modem education and, therefore, Sufism can serve as the vehicle for transformatian in
general, especially in a society in which there are few other vehicles of change. ·

43 The idea of the sheikh of an order funcıioning as a lens is taken from Gilsenan, 1982.
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